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409 
THE EYE ALONE IS THE JUDGE: IMAGES AND 
DESIGN PATENTS 
Rebecca Tushnet* 
Design patents are an area of intellectual property law focused entirely on the 
visual, unlike copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, or the various sui generis 
protections that have occasionally been enacted for specific types of innovation.1  
The law’s traditional bias against, even fear of, the visual2 may help explain why 
design patents have been of less interest to many intellectual property scholars 
than other bodies of IP law.3  Christopher Buccafusco has argued that “[p]atent 
law most directly confronts the sense of sight in the field of design patent law,” 
but that the result has been “considerable confusion and unhappiness among 
courts and commentators.”4  He attributes this anxiety to the discomfort that 
patent judges have “deciding questions of visual aesthetics,”5 and I would simply 
strike “patent” from his description: Judges and lawyers in general are highly 
uncomfortable with images, yet design patents force direct legal engagement with 
images.  This short piece offers an outsider’s view of what design patent law has 
to say about the use of images as legal tools, why tests for design patent 
infringement are likely to stay unsatisfactory, and what lessons other fields of 
intellectual property, specifically copyright, might take from design patent. 
Design patent offers a way to protect the aesthetic, nonfunctional elements 
of a product design.  Unlike copyright, which attaches to original works 
automatically, design patent requires examination and registration by the Patent 
and Trademark Office.  A design patent itself is granted based on the drawing, 
which defines the protected material, rather than on the written description that 
predominates in utility patents.6  The law requires a “written description”7 of 
 *  Professor, Georgetown Law.  Thanks to participants at Georgia’s conference, including 
Stacey Dogan, Jason Du Mont, Mark Janis, and Mark McKenna, and to Greg Vetter, who 
provided helpful comments. 
 1 Proposals for fashion design protection in the U.S., if enacted, would add a design patent-
like protection for fashion also focusing on the visual. 
 2 See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
683 (2012). 
 3 See Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness 
in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419, 423–24 (2010–2011) (contrasting design patent’s popularity with 
patentees with its relative judicial and scholarly inattention). 
 4 Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 
524 (2012); see also id. at 527 (suggesting that “technophile” Federal Circuit judges “are particularly 
anxious about the ‘subjective’ nature of visual pleasure”). 
 5 Id. at 524. 
 6 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 1503.01 (8th ed. rev. Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP] (“No description of the design in the 
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patent claims, but the drawing is the written description for design patents.  
Though the Federal Circuit purported to reject the “linguist[ic]” distinction 
between drawing and writing, it then concluded that the drawing in a design 
patent is the key and the words are incidental: not a rejection but a reversal of 
the usual valuation of words over images in law.8  Words purporting to claim a 
design’s characteristic features cannot serve as a basis for patentability; overall 
appearance is the key.9  
The standard for infringement is also purely visual.  In Gorham Co. v. White, 
the Supreme Court stated that  
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if 
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing 
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one 
patented is infringed by the other.10 
Quoting an English case, the Court held that “the eye alone is the judge of the 
identity of the two things.”11  
But what does it mean for the eye to be the judge in a legal system organized 
around words?  How can the report of an eye be turned into a verdict, and 
further into a reviewable judgment?  In recent years, the Federal Circuit has 
specification beyond a brief description of the drawing is generally necessary, since as a rule the 
illustration in the drawing views is its own best description.” (citing In re Freeman, 23 App. D.C. 
226 (D.C. Cir. 1904))); Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, 157 F.3d 1311, 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (a design patent has “almost no scope beyond the drawings”); In re Mann, 861 F.2d 
1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a design patent is limited to what is shown in drawings); Application of 
Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“The test is inherently a visual test, for the design is 
nothing more than appearance, and the appearance is that of the article as a whole.”). 
 7 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 8 In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the drawings of the design patent 
that provide the description of the invention.  Although linguists distinguish between a drawing 
and a writing, the drawings of the design patent are viewed in terms of the written description 
requirement of § 112.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Concept Innovation v. CFM 
Corp., No. 04 C 3345, 2004 WL 2812109, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2004) (“Unlike utility patents, 
design patents do not describe claimed designs in words: ‘[n]o description, other than a reference 
to the drawing, is ordinarily required . . . .’ ” (citations omitted)); see also MPEP, supra note 6 
(“[W]hile not required, such a [textual] description is not prohibited . . . .”). 
 9 MPEP, supra note 6, § 1503.01 (citing In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (1982)).  Moreover, “if a 
description is presented, it must only describe the appearance of the article illustrated in the 
drawings and not the construction or function of the claimed design.”  Ronald L. Panitch, Design 
Patents, C602 ALI-ABA 295, 303 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). 
 10 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 20 L. Ed. 731, 528 (1871). 
 11 Id. at 526 (quoting Holdsworth v. McCrea, 2 A.C., (H.L.), 388 (U.K.)). 
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struggled with these questions.  After experimenting, post-Markman,12 with 
written descriptions as claim construction,13 the court determined that written 
descriptions of a design patent should be avoided where possible.14  In Egyptian 
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the en banc Federal Circuit held: 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, a design is better 
represented by an illustration “than it could be by any description 
and a description would probably not be intelligible without the 
illustration.” . . . Given the recognized difficulties entailed in 
trying to describe a design in words, the preferable course 
ordinarily will be for a district court not to attempt to ‘construe’ a 
design patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description of 
the claimed design.15 
The key problem with this approach can be briefly stated, though not easily 
resolved: Many designs involve non-novel or functional features, and are only 
protectable because of other novel features, or because of a novel combination 
of otherwise familiar features.  But if the overall effect of the design on the eye 
is the measure of infringement, how are factfinders to avoid potentially 
broadening the scope of the design patent too far when an accused design looks 
like a patented design because of similarities in these unprotectable features?16 
 12 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (setting out a standard for 
claim construction in utility patent cases). 
 13 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Unlike the 
readily available verbal description of the invention and of the prior art that exists in a utility 
patent case, a design patent case presents the judge only with visual descriptions.  Given the lack 
of a visual language, the trial court must first translate these visual descriptions into words—i.e., 
into a common medium of communication.  From this translation, the parties and appellate 
courts can discern the internal reasoning employed by the trial court to reach its decision as to 
whether or not a prior art design is basically the same as the claimed design.” (footnote omitted)); 
id. at 103 n.2 (“When properly done, this verbal description should evoke the visual image of the 
design.”); Concept Innovation v. CFM Corp., No. 04 C 3345, 2004 WL 2812109, at *3 
(describing the court’s role as “consider[ing] the patent’s ornamental features and visual pictures 
as a whole to translate the patent’s visual descriptions into words that evoke the visual image” 
(citations omitted)); Perry J. Saidman & Alison Singh, The Death of Gorham Co. v. White: Killing it 
Softly with Markman, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 792 (2004). 
 14 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Minka 
Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1162, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 770, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 
Jan. 16, 2004) (“[A] district court need not always verbally construe at length a design patent’s 
drawings. The infringement analysis essentially involves comparing the drawings to an accused 
device; a verbal description of the drawings does not necessarily aid such a comparison.”). 
 15 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 679 (citations omitted). 
 16 See, e.g., Durling, 101 F.3d at 104 (finding that a district court construed the claimed design 
“too broadly” and that the description “merely represents the general concept of a sectional sofa 
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(The same problem comes up in copyright, where similarities in unprotectable 
ideas or standard tropes should not suffice for liability, yet the gestalt substantial 
similarity test risks holding defendants liable because of such commonalities.) 
A written description requirement seemed to offer some hope of managing 
the problem, since the factfinder could identify the novel elements of the design 
in writing; only a defendant who copied those elements would infringe.  A 
written description requirement, that is, inherently limited the scope of a design 
patent, serving as a screening device in the same way that courts’ increasingly 
common demand for a written description for an unregistered trade dress now 
does in trademark law.17 
But the word and the image were in serious conflict.  Critics noted that “it is 
difficult to properly and precisely describe with words a design that consists of 
anything more than simple geometric shapes.  Usually the scope of the 
description will be too broad, too narrow, or too ambiguous.”18  Given a single 
picture, different people would produce very different written descriptions.19  
Occasionally, courts suggested that judges in particular, untrained in art, couldn’t 
perform the necessary translations,20 or that design patent drawings were different 
from other types of images in ways that made them hard to describe: “Setting 
down into words what visual impression is created by a fitting for plastic troughs 
carrying fiber optic cables is a remarkably different endeavor than describing 
with integrated end tables”). 
 17 Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 
HOUS. L. REV. 861, 886–87 (2011). 
 18 Brief of Plaintiff Appellant Egyptian Goddess, Inc. for En Banc Appeal at 30 Egyptian 
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (2008) (No. 2006-1562), 2008 WL 545145, at *30 
[hereinafter Egyptian Goddess en banc brief].  Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, at 30; see also 
Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (“[The design] is better represented by the photographic 
illustration than it could be by any description, and a description would probably not be intelligible 
without the illustration.”); In re Freeman, 23 App. D.C. 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1904) (“Undoubtedly, in 
the matter of application for a patent for a design, a picture of the design serves to convey a greatly 
more adequate idea of the design than any verbal description could possibly do; and, in the presence 
of the picture, a superadded verbal description is generally useless and oftentimes confusing.”); 
Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal), 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (2008) (No. 2006-1562), at *5 n.7 [hereinafter 
Apple Brief] (“[T]he standard that verbal descriptions of designs be ‘properly done [in order to] 
evoke the visual image of the design’ has proven unattainable; words simply cannot evoke accurate 
visual images.” (quoting Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). 
 19 See Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, supra note 18, at 30–31. 
 20 See Friedley-Voshardt Co. v. Reliance Metal Spinning Co., 238 F. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) 
(“[I]t is very difficult to put in words a description which so differentiates [the claimed design] 
from the prior art as to convey any vivid impression to one reading this opinion.  This is largely 
due to the inherent difficulty of describing visual impressions in words, which is, of course, 
heightened where the person attempting it is without technical training in drawing or art.”). 
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one’s visual impression of Rembrandt’s ‘The Syndics of the Drapers’ 
Guild.’ . . . [A] picture is its own best description.”21  The easily interpretable 
image might be out there somewhere, in art class, but not before the court. 
Other courts suffered logorrhea in trying to write legalistically precise 
descriptions of designs, when pictures would be much clearer in practice.22  
Compare the picture below with the description immediately following, if you 
can force your way through it: 
 21 ADC Telecomm., Inc. v. Panduit Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1032–33 (D. Minn. 2002). 
 22 See, e.g., Bernardo Footwear, L.L.C. v. Fortune Dynamics, Inc., 2007 WL 4561476, at *2 
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (detailed description of ornamental design for a thong sandal); Durdin v. 
Kuryakyn Holdings Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (long description of 
ornamental design for a motorcycle brake or clutch lever). 
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 The ‘539 design patent claim is directed to an ornamental 
design for a combined ceiling fan and light having fan blades that 
overlie corresponding arms of a central bracket.  The central 
bracket has a circular central opening through which a light 
fixture dome protrudes downward.  The bracket has curved, fin-
shaped arms, each of which sweeps outward from its base at the 
central opening and each of which terminates in a slightly 
rounded tip.  The arms of the bracket are equally spaced about 
the central opening, and the length of each bracket arm is roughly 
one-third the length of the corresponding blade.  The light fixture 
dome exhibits a partial sphere that transitions into a generally 
cylindrical portion adjacent the central bracket.  A central 
housing, located above the fan blades, exhibits a generally 
cylindrical portion just above the fan blades that transitions into a 
concave portion. 
 When viewed from below, the fin-shaped arms of the central 
bracket [sweep] outward from the central opening in a clockwise 
direction, which gives the appearance of a “running” pointed star.  
A symmetrical, elongated, generally football shaped cutout 
appears behind the leading edge of each arm.  The fan blades are 
also swept in the clockwise direction, with the leading edges of 
the blades forming a sweeping curve near the bracket central 
opening.  The trailing edges of the blades are straight but slightly 
offset from a diameter of the bracket central opening.  The 
trailing edge of each blade smoothly transitions into the trailing 
edge of the corresponding bracket arm, which further forms a 
curved transition into the leading edge of the next bracket arm.  
A gently receding arc in front of each bracket arm’s leading edge 
runs from the tip of each arm to the middle of the smooth 
transition.  Each fan blade terminates in a gently rounded corner 
on the leading edge and a sharply angled, rounded corner on the 
trailing edge.  From its tip, the trailing edge of each bracket arm 
flares inwardly and rearwardly away from the straight trailing edge 
of the corresponding blade until it intersects the leading edge of 
the following blade.  Due to the sweep of the bracket arms, the 
leading edge of each fan blade is substantially more exposed than 
in the trailing edge of each fan blade.   
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 When viewed from above, the fan blades are swept in the 
counter-clockwise direction, which also gives the appearance of a 
pointed “running” star.  Also when viewed from above, the 
trailing edge of the bracket arm is visible at the base of each fan 
blade.23 
In this case, a picture is worth over 400 words.  Which artifact, the image or 
the text, provides a clearer understanding of the protected matter? 
It’s not that the problem of ambiguity is unknown to text, of course—
ambiguities abound in contract cases, advertising law cases, and myriad other 
legal disputes based on text.  Still, critics of written descriptions in design patent 
cases maintained that images were routinely harder to translate into words than 
other artifacts such as the products or processes claimed by utility patents.24 
In addition, those who advocated avoiding written descriptions invoked the 
concept of “verbal overshadowing.”25  Though they did not use the term or cite 
the scientific literature on the ways in which using words can change 
perceptions of nonverbal stimuli,26 they made the same argument as found in 
that literature: People who produce a verbal description of a visual object do 
not see that object in the same way as people who just look at it.27  Opponents 
of written descriptions thus argued that fact finders’ decisions would be 
distorted by words, giving too much or too little emphasis to features of a 
design depending on the words chosen.28  The result, Apple Computer claimed 
 23 Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., 2002 WL 1331883, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 24 See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in 
Support of Neither Party, at 19, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 
699184, at *20 [hereinafter Houston Brief] (arguing that Markman’s claim construction holding 
was based on precedent dealing solely with judicial construction of written instruments, not 
“visually defined” patent grants). 
 25 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 735. 
 26 Id. at 691. 
 27 Id. at 735–38. 
 28 See, e.g., Saidman & Singh, supra note 13, at 793 (arguing that verbalization leads factfinders 
to compare the accused design with the verbalization, not with the patented design, thus further 
leading them to require a finding of all the elements verbalized in the description before 
infringement can be found, which obscures the reaction of the ordinary observer to the design as 
a whole); Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, supra note 18, at 31 (“[W]hen a drawing is described in 
words, the words have a tendency to make all portions of the drawing perceptively equivalent 
unless the words expressly increase or decrease the visually perceptive importance of a particular 
feature, i.e., by using adjectives and adverbs and by using descriptive terms such as major, minor, 
prominent, dominant, etc. . . . However, when descriptive words are used to increase or decrease 
the visually perceptive importance of a particular design feature, the drawing then is not being 
merely observed by the jury, but rather is being observed by the jury as the design has been interpreted 
and expressed in words by the court.  The problem with this is that a jury (after being properly 
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in its amicus brief in Egyptian Goddess, was that defendants won summary 
judgments eight times more often than plaintiffs did, because of written 
descriptions that distorted the scope of design patents.29 
Of course, this is only a defect if you own design patents.  For those who 
feared being sued more than they wanted to sue, written descriptions were 
correspondingly more popular.30  However, it’s not particularly attractive to set 
instructed on the ordinary observer test) may or may not place the same perceptive emphasis on a 
design element as the court.” (emphasis in original)); Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Intellectual Property Law Assoc. in Support of Neither Party at 25, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. 
Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 644360, at 34 (Feb. Cir. 5, 2000) [hereinafter AIPLA Brief] 
(“A juror’s perception of the overall appearance of the claimed design may very well differ from 
the court’s expressed verbalization (and for that matter the court’s perception).  It is also possible 
that a juror’s perception may change after reading the court’s construction.  Even if the court only 
provides the written instruction as a guide, the same problems of undue influence or changed 
perception may arise.  Such a predicament is bound to yield inconsistent and compromised 
results.”); Apple Brief, supra note 18, at 9–10 (“Since words are a poor substitute for how a design 
actually appears to the eye, a verbalized design patent claim can only divert the task of the jury 
from its age-old mandate. . . . [T]he jury is likely to check whether each of the words in the 
verbalization are found in the accused design, akin to a literal infringement test, rather than 
whether the designs are visually substantially the same.  Thus, verbalization derogates how the 
claimed design actually appears to the eye.” (citation omitted)); Brief of Amici Curiae Electrolux 
Home Products, Inc. and Nike, Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal) at 20, 
Egyptian, Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 644361 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2008) 
(“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to describe with clarity the ‘meaning’ of the patented design as 
a whole.  Indeed, verbalization of the design elements often can lead to certain elements being 
emphasized to the exclusion of others, all because of the word choice made by the court during 
the claim construction process.  The jury may be confused and erroneously believe that emphasis 
should be given to certain design elements, while at the same time being instructed to focus on 
the overall appearance of the design as shown in the drawings.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae 
Industrial Designers Society of America in Support of the Reversal Sought by Plaintiff-Appellant 
at 1, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 644362 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 
2008) [hereinafter Industrial Designers Brief] (“It serves no purpose to construe the design patent 
drawings in words, and then to compare those words to the accused design.  The words will 
necessarily either broaden or restrict the scope of the design patent claim, in an unpredictable 
manner.”); Houston Brief, supra note 24, at 20–21 (“[V]erbalization of design patent 
claims . . . invites improper violation of a design patent litigant’s jury trial right. . . . It is not 
appropriate for the fact finder to compare a court’s detailed description of the patented design 
with the accused design.  Overly detailed description of a design patent’s drawings, however, 
invites the fact finder to not observe, i.e., to not conduct the fundamental exercise required to 
determine whether infringement exists.” (citations omitted)). 
 29 See Apple Brief, supra note 18, at 10 & n.12. 
 30 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Lkg Corp. et al., Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 
2006-1562, 2008 WL 1376324 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 18, 2008).  Reliance on images favors the patentee 
at the infringement stage: It’s easier to identify differences between designs using words.  But this 
same characteristic has a different valence when novelty is assessed.  When seeking a patent, the 
applicant is likely to want to identify specific details that differentiate a design from the prior art.  
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a standard with the aim of causing one side to lose more often, unless we 
actually have a good reason to want that result.  The difficulty of describing a 
design may have nothing to do with how novel it is or how likely another 
design is to be confusingly similar to it.31   
The written description does at least attempt to create a reviewable record 
and to ask questions that can sometimes be answered on summary judgment.32  
As with copyright infringement, the ordinary observer test makes design patent 
infringement findings harder to review and analyze; as gestalts, they are difficult 
to dissect.33  As a result, favoring visual comparison over written descriptions 
will be likely to favor design patent owners over accused infringers.34  With 
visual comparisons, it’s easier to say “these just look alike to me” (and harder to 
grant summary judgment or a motion to dismiss based on a lack of similarity) 
whereas written descriptions require more precise identification of the design’s 
novelty compared to earlier designs.  This subjectivity predictably increases a 
defendant’s costs of even a successful defense, making it more likely that 
legitimate competition will be suppressed by legal threats.  (The force of this 
conclusion will depend on one’s assessment of the relative prevalence of 
infringers and legitimate competitors in the market; with enough of the former 
around, we might be willing to sacrifice a few of the latter, and vice versa.) 
This argument about uncertainty as encouragement to less meritorious 
plaintiffs did not convince the Federal Circuit in Egyptian Goddess.  One reason 
may be that images often seem transparent to us: They seem so clearly to mean 
one thing that we doubt that other people will see them differently—even 
though people do see the same image in very different ways, and even though 
we understand that different people will produce very different verbal 
descriptions of the same image.35  This supposed transparency allowed 
proponents of an image-based standard to contend that focusing on images 
would make outcomes easier to predict: Anyone could look and see whether two 
Later, with the patent in hand, pictures and generalities will be more appealing.   
 31 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademarking and Advertising Law, 48 
HOUS. L. REV. 861, 890 (2011) (discussing this problem with respect to trade dress). 
 32 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“From this 
translation, the parties and appellate courts can discern the internal reasoning employed by the 
trial court to reach its decision as to whether or not a prior art design is basically the same as the 
claimed design.”). 
 33 See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement 28 (Stanford Public 
Law Working Paper No. 1661434), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661434 (copyright 
infringement). 
 34 See Perry J. Saidman, Egyptian Goddess Exposed! But Not in the Buff(er), 90 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 884–85 (2008). 
 35 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 688–93. 
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designs were too similar.36  The history of the ordinary observer test in 
copyright cases involving images is, to put it mildly, not promising on this 
point.37  Unfortunately, it may be very difficult for any given observer to 
understand how, in the absence of bad faith, another person could see 
something else in that image; obviousness cuts off analysis.   
Moreover, images are themselves highly manipulable.  In a design patent, by 
controlling how the design looks in the patent—which representational 
conventions to observe—the patentee can influence judgments about whether 
similar designs are sufficiently similar to infringe: 
[F]or a given selected design, a number of different sets of 
drawings can be prepared.  For example, phantom lines can be 
applied to “prior art” aspects of a design, so that a patent holder 
can focus attention, for that particular embodiment, on the new 
feature or “point of novelty.”  If there are a number of such 
features, by showing those features as solid lines and other 
portions in phantom, again the patent holder can direct attention 
where desired, with respect to the evaluation of infringement.”38  
Nonetheless, the en banc Federal Circuit largely endorsed the idea that the 
images should be allowed to speak for themselves.  There remained the 
problem of functional and non-novel features, as well as of special 
characteristics of design patent drawings, such as the broken lines used to 
identify features that are not claimed as part of the design, and that a jury would 
not know how to interpret without instruction.  In those cases, even opponents 
of written descriptions conceded that words ought to be used to clarify matters 
for the fact finder,39 and the en banc Egyptian Goddess court agreed.40   
 36 Saidman & Singh, supra note 13, at 807–08. 
 37 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 734. 
 38 Randy A. Hillson & Julie R. Daulton, Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa: A Tale of Two Tests, in THE 
IP BOOK, at 9; see also Saidman & Singh, supra note 13, at 799 (claiming visual determinations 
make infringement easier to find because similarities are more apparent than when using verbal 
descriptions). 
 39 See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, supra note 18, at 52; Industrial Designers Brief, 
supra note 28, at 1–2 (functionality); cf. Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., 2004 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 770, at *5 (more extensive verbalizations “may be helpful particularly if the drawings 
contain features that are not part of the patented design, e.g., if the drawings contain functional 
features or if there is a point of novelty issue to consider”). 
 40 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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Later, the Federal Circuit approved a process of dissecting a design to screen 
out identified functional features before performing a holistic assessment.41  
Unfortunately, these two steps are fundamentally contradictory, since analytic 
dissection interferes with gestalt evaluation.42  One sign of this incompatibility 
comes from cases that recite Egyptian Goddess’s disavowal of written description 
as a means of defining and limiting the scope of a design patent, then use 
hundreds of words to describe why prior art is so similar to the accused design 
that there can be no infringement.43  Pictures, it seems, routinely fail to speak 
for themselves. 
This is not to say that concerns driving a two-step test are misguided: Those 
who argue that a proper infringement analysis shouldn’t involve any dissection, 
because ordinary observers don’t decompose designs into their constituent 
elements or filter out functional or unprotectable parts,44 face difficulty when 
dealing with accused designs that are also highly similar to the prior art.45  Even 
if a design patent’s scope is essentially limited to the drawing, applying the 
infringement standard that ordinary observers would be deceived into thinking 
the plaintiff’s and defendant’s designs are the same will often require some 
reference to prior art, since non-expert observers would otherwise be tempted 
 41 See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 42 See Shin Chang, The Proper Role of Functionality in Design Patent Infringement Analysis: A Criticism of 
the Federal Circuit Decision In Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 309, 325 
(2011) (“Filtering or ignoring any element, let alone individual functional elements, from a construed 
claim before applying the ordinary observer test inevitably changes the overall appearance of the 
patented design.”); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Designing the American Patent System 41–42 & 
n.259, http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1862182 (pointing out the incompatibilities in this approach);  see 
also Tushnet, supra note 2, at 736–38 (making the same point about the similar two-step process in 
copyright infringement doctrine).   
 43 See Arc’teryx Equipment, Inc. v. Westcomb Outerwear, Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1895 (D. 
Utah 2008) (“[I]t is unnecessary to construe the . . . Patent by providing a detailed verbal 
description of the claimed design.  Rather, the Court will rely upon the illustrations . . ., as they 
better represent the claimed design.”); id. at 1896 (using 389 words to explain how the ordinary 
observer would see the patented and accused jackets, then providing further verbal descriptions 
of the prior art in the course of finding noninfringement). 
 44 See, e.g., Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test For Design Patent 
Infringement—On a Crash Course With The Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v. White, 8 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354, 357, 370 (2009); Sylvia Ngo, Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa: 
Patently Obvious? Reconciling the Ordinary Observer and Point of Novelty Tests, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 
110, 125 (2010). 
 45 See Carani, supra note 44, at 378–79 (admitting that fact finders will have to be educated 
about prior art). 
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to lump too many things together.46  “They all look alike to me” is a cliché for a 
reason.   
We do not want a standard that lets a fact finder conclude that a copy of the 
prior art infringes a patented design.  We have two possible ways of avoiding 
this result: We could have a validity/nonobviousness standard that invalidates 
design patents entirely in such cases, or we could have a rule requiring that the 
confusing similarity necessary for infringement must relate to the protectable 
elements of the patented design.  The former standard would invalidate large 
numbers of design patents (and pose serious litigation challenges of its own); 
the latter seems like more of a compromise, allowing more design patents but 
limiting their scope and forcing us to administer their boundaries with greater 
care.  But the resulting test will continue to seem unsatisfactory because it is 
trying to serve two masters: holistic assessment of confusing similarity and 
filtration of unprotectable elements. 
Assuming we want to prevent findings of infringement when two designs 
are only similar in non-novel aspects, how can this best be done?47  Instead of 
using only words, we could give the fact finder pictures of the prior art.  If an 
accused design was more similar to the closest prior art than to the patented 
design, then there should be no infringement, as in the following case: 
 46 See, e.g., Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(infringement exists if an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art would be deceived into 
believing that the accused design is the same as the patented design). 
 47 See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
deceptive similarity must be the result of similarities in overall design, not of similarities in 
functional features); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“For a design patent to be infringed, however, no matter how similar two items look, ‘the 
accused device must appropriate the novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from 
the prior art.’  That is, even though the court compares two items through the eyes of the 
ordinary observer, it must nevertheless, to find infringement, attribute their similarity to the 
novelty which distinguishes the patented device from the prior art.” (citations omitted)). 
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48
 
The American Intellectual Property Law Association offered the following 
hypothetica
49 
 
In a vacuum, the two designs look highly similar and the accused design 
seems likely to be infringing.  Now suppose that, in fact, the prior art contains a 
design that looks almost exactly like the accused design—it’s the heart in the 
top right corner of the patented design that is the novel feature.  Once the prior 
 48 Coca-Cola Co. v. Whistle Co. of America, 20 F.2d 955, 957 (D. Del. 1927) (“Save for such 
similarity as results from the common use of the ogee curve [found in the prior art] . . ., the most 
casual observer would find no difficulty in distinguishing [the patented] bottle from the [accused 
bottle].”). 
 49 AIPLA Brief, supra note 28, at 2. 
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art is taken into account, a finding of noninfringement should follow.50  But 
AIPLA made its case particularly easy by positing prior art just like the accused 
design.  Suppose the prior art has a circle where the patented design has a heart: 
if the novelty consisted of changing the circle to a heart, does changing the 
circle to a star copy the novel aspect of the patented design?  Pictures alone 
can’t answer what are fundamentally normative and empirical questions about 
consumers’ perceptions of confusing similarity.51  Fact  finders will still have to 
make judgments about how far the penumbra of any particular design or piece 
of prior art extends. 
Still, for an outsider to design patent law, the suggested multi-image 
comparison approach has obvious merits for limiting the scope of design 
patents to novel aesthetic innovations, at least where there is substantial prior 
art (as there will often be).  For someone more familiar with copyright law, one 
natural question is whether a similar approach could help in copyright law, 
where substantial similarity as a test for copyright infringement is a mess.52   
I think we’d be better off without the doctrine of substantial similarity, and 
with a true reproduction right, with highly similar works dealt with as derivative 
works.53  However, since that’s unlikely to happen, it’s worth thinking about 
whether substantial similarity doctrine could be improved by, in essence, placing 
the plaintiff’s work alongside an array of prior art and trying to place the 
accused work in the “space” defined by the expressive universe.54  When asking 
whether the similarity between two works is too great, we might then frame the 
question whether the similarity between the plaintiff’s work and the accused 
work is any greater than the similarity between the accused work and other 
 50 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“When the differences between the claimed and accused design are viewed in light of the prior 
art, the attention of the hypothetical ordinary observer will be drawn to those aspects of the 
claimed design that differ from the prior art.  And when the claimed design is close to the prior 
art designs, small differences between the accused design and the claimed design are likely to be 
important to the eye of the hypothetical ordinary observer.”). 
 51 In the context of invalidity for obviousness, the Federal Circuit has attempted to deal with 
the question of how far the “penumbra” of any given design extends by requiring a single primary 
reference “basically the same as the claimed design” before an obviousness challenge can be 
made.  Then, the primary reference can be modified by other secondary references related to the 
primary reference.  See Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1386 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009).  The court specifically declined to opine on whether a similar approach should be used 
for infringement.  In the example in the text, if the primary reference had a circle and the 
patented design had a heart, the Titan Tire approach would not seem to help determine whether a 
star was “too close” to the heart. 
 52 Lemley, supra note 33; Tushnet, supra note 2. 
 53 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 45–46. 
 54 Cf. Ngo, supra note 44, at 128 (stating that copyright lacks the concept of prior art). 
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noninfringing expressions of the same idea, where other expressions have been 
identified.   
The idea/expression distinction means that only expression can be owned, 
and ideas may be freely copied.  Usually copyright cases formally use the 
distinction to compare two isolated works.  Yet the concept of an unprotectable 
idea necessarily implies the existence of many other works, both actual and 
potential.  Tropes, scènes à faire (events or characters standard in works of a 
particular type), and other generic features are unprotectable, but identifying 
them generally requires some concept of a “standard” work of the relevant type.  
Thus, in practice, defendants will often point to other works on the same topics 
and sharing the same similarities that plaintiffs claim show infringement of their 
particular works.55    
The barriers to using prior art as a useful addition to copyright’s arsenal are 
primarily two: First, unlike patent infringement, copyright infringement requires 
actual copying.  Thus, even if two works are more similar to each other than to 
any pre-existing work, there will be no infringement unless the defendant 
actually copied the plaintiff’s work; inversely, if the defendant copied the 
plaintiff’s work, it is no defense to say that another work is, coincidentally, even 
more similar to the defendant’s work.  Given the copying requirement, it can be 
conceptually muddled to bring in the idea of prior art, of which neither the 
defendant nor the plaintiff may actually have been aware, as a restriction on the 
scope of a copyright.56  Thus, in copyright, the purpose of familiarizing a fact-
finder with the prior art as part of an infringement inquiry would have to be 
different than for design patents: Prior art might provide evidence that any 
similarities between the works are due not to the defendant’s copying but to the 
common cultural well from which both works drew. 
 55 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no copyright protection 
for the title/lyrics “You’re the One for Me” where “hundreds of composers have registered songs 
capturing the same sentiment in the same verbiage”); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 
F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding district court’s finding that the phrase “you’ve got to 
stand for something, or you’ll fall for anything” was not protectable because it “enjoyed a robust 
existence in the public domain long before [plaintiff] employed it for his song’s title and in the 
key lyrics”); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(common musical phrases); Capcom Co. v. Mkr. Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 4661479 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
20, 2008) (zombie stories); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Embassy Pictures, 1982 WL 
1274, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 1982) (“[T]he pose of loving couples, even against a tropical 
background, is too common to constitute protectible expression.”). 
 56 As for the plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff contributed expression of her own rather than 
copying, the fact that she produced a run-of-the-mill work is irrelevant to its protectability; there 
is no novelty requirement as in patent. 
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Second, design patent does not have an idea/expression distinction.  The 
idea/expression distinction puts some parts of a copyrighted work immediately 
in the public domain even if they are entirely new: new ideas or new facts and 
discoveries.57  Even if there is no relevant prior art, then, a copyright’s scope is 
still more limited than that of a patent, which can protect new designs or 
discoveries.  For example, the first person to write a story about a zoo filled 
with dinosaurs recreated from their DNA does not have a copyright monopoly 
on the overall concept, even if she was truly the first.  Indeed, when two works 
use the same core idea, similarities in other plot elements that naturally follow—
in order to create drama, the animals must escape, and so on—are also freely 
copiable.58 
For these reasons, I do not advocate for wholesale incorporation of design 
patent infringement analysis in copyright infringement analysis.  However, the 
conceptual insight that is front and center in many design patent infringement 
inquiries could still be useful: Works exist within a field of other works.  As a 
result, fact finders can get relevant information by assessing other works in the 
same field.  This idea, though implicit in many copyright cases, could be made 
more explicit.59  Looking at prior art in copyright could help define what 
constitutes protectable expression and what is merely an idea or concept that 
should not be subject to any single creator’s control.  Distance from existing 
works should not be the sole test for substantial similarity in copyright, for the 
reasons noted above, but it could help make the elusive distinction between 
idea and expression more concrete in specific cases, such as the multiple 
infringement claims against the hit film Avatar, each arguing that Avatar copied 
the plaintiff’s story of a military type who rebels against his superiors in order to 
save an endangered civilization.60 
 57 Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 147. 
 58 See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 59 For a contrasting approach, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in 
Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2014395.  Balganesh suggests that courts should determine the conceptual 
“thickness” of a plaintiff’s copyright without reference to the defendant’s work because what’s 
protectable “can be gleaned entirely from the plaintiff’s work, perhaps with the aid of external 
evidence such as expert testimony.”  Id. at 24.  Balganesh assumes that conventions can routinely 
be inferred from single exemplars, and skims over the insufficiencies of that approach by 
referring vaguely to “expert testimony,” which will presumably explain which parts of the 
plaintiff’s work are common.  But that’s a vital part of the process, not an add-on: Someone 
who’d never encountered a Western could have great difficulty distinguishing generic features 
from unique scenarios, much like someone who’d never encountered the designs discussed in 
text. 
 60 Eriq Gardner, Know Your ‘Avatar’ Lawsuits: Meet Three Plaintiffs Who Hope to Win Billions, 
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In fact, the contrast between copyright and design patent helps illuminate 
the problems with Samson Vermont’s idea that uniqueness is the key to 
copyright.61  Because copyright protects expression, not ideas, having a really 
novel idea (while it might justify a broad utility or design patent) does not justify 
a broad copyright.  As Judge Kozinski has written, “I can’t publish 
unauthorized copies of, say, Presumed Innocent; I can’t make a movie out of it.  
But I’m perfectly free to write a book about an idealistic young prosecutor on 
trial for a crime he didn’t commit.”62  In such cases, we would recognize the 
immediate source of the second author’s idea while also recognizing that his 
work was a very different expression of that idea.  While Vermont argues that 
the high concept “prairie dog meets seahorse on Pluto” is so unique that it 
should be protected against copying,63 the cases correctly hold that copying a 
premise is simply insufficient to infringe.64  Dinosaur zoos; zombies in a mall; 
snakes on a plane: All are entertaining ideas, but not as such protected 
copyrighted works even at the point at which only the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s work embody those ideas.  As a result, one key implication of the 
idea/expression distinction is that, while design patent cases consider only 
existing prior art,65 in copyright we must also consider other possible 
noninfringing expressions of the same idea, to help define the metes and 
bounds of a particular expression. 
Prior art, even in pictures instead of words, is no more a panacea in design 
patent than it is in copyright.  In the end, a picture may be worth a thousand 
words, but it cannot substitute for a final judgment about how close is too 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/avatar-la 
wsuits-james-cameron-new-plaintiffs-275707. 
 61 Samson Vermont, The Sire Qua Non of Copyright is Uniqueness, Not Originality, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1906047.  Vermont argues that patents are different from copyrights 
because inventions, unlike expressive works, are “constrained by shared reality.”  Id. at 34.  His 
analysis therefore ignores design patents, not to mention the social constraints that makes 
“utility” much more about human choices than about the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology.  
See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUSTON L. REV. 823, 853–54 (2011) (explaining that 
utilitarian functionality is often a matter of socially constructed desires and expectations). 
 62 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514–15 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
 63 Vermont, supra note 61, at 59–60. 
 64 See, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Ent’mt Inc., 607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (American 
becomes samurai in Meiji Japan); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent’mt Co., 462 F.3d 1072 
(9th Cir. 2006) (small funeral home taken over by two brothers after their father’s death). 
 65 Design patent obviousness determinations can involve hypothetical prior art created by 
combining references.  See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1240 
(Fed. Cir. 2009).  Nonetheless, even these hypotheticals must be created by combining existing 
designs. 
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close.  Design patent cases suggest the difficulties embedded even in the most 
apparently limited images.  While design patents are in theory limited almost 
precisely to the image shown in the patent, and therefore patentees may even 
submit photos instead of more manipulable drawings,66 difficult questions of 
scope continue to arise as patentees assert the right to prevent more than pure 
copying.  Indeed, in the recent Apple/Samsung litigation, the jury held Samsung 
liable for over a billion dollars in damages, in significant part because of Apple’s 
design patents on portions of its products, rather than on their overall 
appearance.67  If substantial similarity is sufficient for infringement, we need to 
know what’s enough to be substantial, and what constraints there will be on the 
factfinder, especially when some kinds of copying (such as copying elements 
already in the public domain) are supposed to be favored by public policy.  
Punting to the overall impression of the image is not enough, even though it’s 
always a temptation. 
 66  See William J. Rankin, The “Person Skilled in the Art” Is Really Quite Conventional: U.S. Patent 
Drawings and the Persona of the Inventor, 1870-2005, in MAKING AND UNMAKING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 55, 60 (Mario 
Biagioli, Peter Jaszi, and Martha Woodmansee eds. 2011) (“[For design patents], standards for 
both disclosure and protection are more narrowly circumscribed and the primary worth of the 
patent is to establish successful reduction to practice, as in a simple registration system (similar to 
copyright).  Not coincidentally, plants and designs are often accompanied by photographs, and 
photographs tend to provide only mimetic evidence; neither explanatory nor ambiguous, they are 
useful primarily for proving infringement.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 67  See Sarah Burstein, Guest Post: Design Patents and Apple v. Samsung, MADISONIAN.NET, 
Aug. 27, 2012, http://madisonian.net/2012/08/27/guest-post-design-patents-and-apple-v-sams 
ung-2/ (discussing the relevance of the patent drawings and Apple’s design patents on portions of 
the overall products); Michael Risch, Brief Initial Thoughts on Apple v. Samsung, 
MADISONIAN.NET, Aug. 25, 2012, http://madisonian.net/2012/08/25/brief-initial-thoughts-on-a 
pple-v-samsung/ (noting the breadth of the design patent infringement claims in the case).  
